We formalize the design and logical verification of a fault diagnosis and monitoring system for intra-platoon communication systems.
Introduction
We are interested in studying the fault diagnostics of platooning vehicles. It is understood that a platoon is a string of vehicles with distributed control strategies. Vehicles rely on real-time control data from other vehicles for correct execution of their control laws. A timedriven system is responsible for delivering the control data.
This document formalizes the design and logical verification of a fault diagnosis and monitoring system for intra-platoon communication systems. The design presented here is motivated by the ideas given in [l, 2,3,4]. The design is formally specified using the SHIFT programming language, [ 5 ] , for networks of hybrid automata. We embellish the SHIFT specification with the meta language GRIZZLY, [6] . Finally, the SHIFT-KRONOS connection, [6, 71 , is used to verify the logical correctness of the design. One advantage of this approach is that the same specification is used for both verification and simulation. This aspect is emphasized since verification of the specification refers to the correctness of the underlying logic whereas simulation deals with performance issues. In addition, ongoing research at PATH will allow us to generate real-time code suitable for implementation from the same specification.
The next section presents the plant models. In Section 3 we present the design of our diagnoser for intraplatoon communication systems. Section 4 presents the computer aided verification of our design.
We assume a layered architecture for the LAN. Our purpose is to design a diagnostic system that resides at the application level of this hierarchy, i.e., a diagnostic protocol that can separate channel faults from hardware faults and isolate the vehicle in which the hardware fault is located. Note that a persistent channel fault may be diagnosed as a hardware fault. 0-7803-5250-51991$10.00 0 1999 IEEE 3520
Formal Plant Models
We will describe the plant, communication channel and diagnosers formally. For this purpose we will use SHIFT, a hybrid system programming language with simulation semantics, and KRONOS , a timed automata verification tool. The gap between simulation and verification is bridged through the meta-language GRIZZLY, an extension of the SHIFT programming language. use a discrete event formalism with interleaved semantics to represent concurrency. We will use the discrete event formalism of SHIFT to model the system and we will embellish this model with real-time constraints using GRIZZLY.
Channel Model
We will maintain that the channel characteristics varies significantly from vehicle-to-vehicle. For a detailed discussion of channel characteristics and channel parameters refer to [8] . We will categorize the communication channels to emphasize that these channels may implicitly have different characteristics:
Synchronization The synchronization channel carries the control packet, sm, transmitted by the lead vehicle, 1. This is a single-node broadcast channel where all vehicles except the leader are recipients of this message. The synchronization message, sm, is a control packet with a synchronization prefix that the recipient vehicles use to synchronize their clocks with the leaders. Vehicles with unsynchronized clocks cannot transmit or receive messages.
Control
The control message channel represents a channel between two consecutive vehicles. It carries the control message, cm, from the vehicle-infront to the vehicle-in-back.
Loopback
The loopback message channel represents a channel between two consecutive vehicles. The loopback message, lbm, is carried from the vehicle-in-back to the vehicle-in-front.
We will implement all three types of channels using a common timed automaton. Figure 1 illustrates the channel model. We will use the shorthand ChannelXm,itter~Receiver to denote a uni-directional channel from Xmitter to Receiver. The superscript Normally, the channel remains in the getMessage mode until it is interrupted by some transmitter, X m i t t e r , requesting a message, msg, to be sent to some receiver, Receiver. In that casel the channel moves to the PutMessage mode and thereafter determines whether that message should successfuh go through. The boolean function f should be a statistical model representing the transmission characteristics of the channel; specifically, f will be different for synchronization, control and loopback channels. F i n a h , the channel model returns to the getMessage mode.
The auxiliary variable msg represents the message of the transmitter, X m i t t e r . Its value is irrelevant for verification since we are not concerned with the contents of the control packets. The auxiliary variable rev is used to select the target receiver when f is true. rcv is nil i f f is false.
Note that this channel is uni-directional and that
Follower Vehicle, f The follower vehicle receives two messages: s m from the leader, and em from second vehicle. It transmits cm to the back vehicle.
Back Vehicle, b The back vehicle is different from the rest of the vehicles since it does not transmit any control messages.
Each vehicle contains a controller and a diagnoser that runs as an application on a TDMA channel. Each cycle requires 5T time, where in a practical implementation T = 20ms (we will use T = 1 for verification purposes).
Messages of type s m and c m are transmitted by control applications and are received by both control and diagnoser applications. On the other hand, lbm messages are transmitted and received only by the diagnoser applications. As such, the role of lbm messages is to inflate the observation sets of the diagnosers.
At the beginning of each cycle the leader, 1, broadcasts the synchronization message, sm. The order in which the message is received by the follower vehicles is not important. Vehicles other than the leader will not transmit or receive messages until they have successfully received sm, we will that the synchro-'he receiver, Receiver, is expected to have a nonblocking transition that expects to synchronize on m E nization hardware of the radio devices of each vehicle is such that Once they receive s m their clocks are synchro-{ s m , cm,lbm}.
Plant model
In this section we will model the plant (i.e. the LAN of a platoon given in Figure 2 .) We will classify the vehicles in a platoon into 4 different categories as illustrated in Figure 2: nized for n cycles, during which they may communicate with each other.
After s m is transmitted by the leader, I , the second vehicle, s, transmits a control message to its follower, f , Then the follower, f , transmits its control message to the back vehicle, b, and this marks the end of the cycle 
Fault modeling
A fault can be modeled in several ways. Formally, a fault is a permanent breakdown of either the transmitter of a single radio device or its receiver. We will model transmitter faults by simply disengaging the outgoing channel' between that transmitter and its recipient. We will model a receiver fault by using a symbol to denote whether the receiver is operational or not. In the latter case, the receiver must not block the transmitter from transmitting a message into the channel, albeit the message will get lost. Note that the successful transmission/reception of a message occurs only with transition y, and also note that only successfully received messages are observable by a diagnoser. The observation is indicated by the propagation of the event di : c m where di is the diagnoser of the receiving vehicle.
The auxiliary symbol rcvFaultP (i.e. Receiver Faulty Predicate) is assigned a $True2 value whenever there is a permanent receiver fault. The reset function $(t) resets the timer t : otherwise The auxiliary clock t' is used to reset the value o f t to the correct value in case the timeout for t occurred at the end of the cycle.
We will present the formal description of the second vehicle (s). We will use the transmitter and receiver of Figure 3 as a black box for a more compact representation.
Second vehicle specification, s
The second vehicle initially waits for the synchronization message from the leader. Once srn is received from the leader, the synchronized radio device is assumed to maintain a synchronized clock for n cycles (i.e. n approximates the crystal drift). If n > N (i.e. the clocks are not synchronized), the second vehicle must receive s m from the leader to continue normal operation, otherwise it remains idle until the next cycle where the leader will broadcast sm once again. Note that this constraint on s m does not apply to c m or lbm type messages. 
Notation 1 Recall that a channel from vehicle x to vehicle r for transmitting m type messages is denoted with
C h a n n e l k . Furthermore, the successful transmission of a message over this channel can only be observed by the receiver r upon the event y (see Figure 3) 
{ l t f , l r f , s t f , s r f , f t f , f r f , b r f } where l t f stands
for lead vehicle transmitter fault, lrf stands for lead vehicle receiver fault and so on. We will let any diagnoser identify any fault so that for all 2 E { l , s , f , b} We will choose the estimates of each diagnoser from 2'j; that is, for each diagnoser vi : E$,+ 2'f. The Figure 5 : Second vehicle diagnoser observation structure.
Second vehicle diagnoser design A simple design for the second vehicle diagnoser is to take the projection of the global plant behavior onto
Ed.. This is given in Figure 5 . Furthermore, consider the regular operation of the plant under no faults. This operation is modeled as (t 1 : s t t f : s)*. Under any kind of fault the resulting behavior will be (t (1 : The preceding discussion suggests, from symmetry, that we can parse observation sequences to simplify our observation structure. that there is nothing wrong with its receivers and the lead vehicle and follower vehicle transmitters. Note also that if the second vehicle can receive from the follower then the follower receiver must also be operating, otherwise it would not have been able to receive from the leader to synchronize its clocks. Hence, in the case of repeatedly many occurring a's the second vehicle diagnoser guesses that if there is a fault it must be one of
s I t ) t t ( f
In the case of repetitive observation of b's the second vehicle assumes that either the lead vehicle transmitter is faulty and the follower vehicle is able to transmit on a previously synchronized clock (note that this means once a clock is synchronized it maintains its validity for sufficiently long)
or there is a persistent channel fault in Channel,"=, .
In the first case the second vehicle diagnoser may safely assume that there is a fault and it is l t f . In the second case there may be no real hardware fault but the problem formulation of Section 2 states that a persistent channel fault may be identified as a hardware fault. Hence we will let the estimation set of repeatedly many occurring b's be { l t f } . In case of repeatedly many occurring c's it should be clear that the follower vehicle either, has a transmitter or receiver fault. And in case of repeatedly many occurring d's it should be evident that either the lead vehicle is not transmitting or the second vehicle is not receiving.
We may modify these arguments to account for persistent or repetitive channel faults for all cases but this is not necessary since these types of faults will be identified wrongly as a hardware fault as we illustrated in the reasoning for the case of repeatedly many occurring b's. make an attempt with n = 1 and if this does not work we will attempt with n = 2 and so on. Such a quantification implies that the verification of the diagnosers is a semi-decidable procedure.
Decision logic
Let the decision time be n. Then, each diagnoser will produce as estimate every n cycles. Let a r n f l , u m j s , o,f, and dmfr be the estimates generated at cycle n. Then we choose 0 to be the intersection of these estimates whenever the intersection yields a single fault:
Modeling the diagnosers requires modeling the parsers that identify the non-terminals a,b,c,d, and modeling the functions 0 and v, for each x E { I , s , f , b} as timed automatons. We will not present these models here.
Verification of diagnosability
We must first show that our design is admissible. The design is clearly consistent since we are taking the synchronous composition of the plant model and the diagnoser models. states in each of the diagnosers we check for the safety property:
The diagnoser correctness is verified with the SHIFT-KRONOS connection ([91). The source code for our design is readily available-from [9] . T r u e j 4 0 e r r o r
That is, if the error state is not reachable then the diagnosers do not block the plant. Furthermore, it is References immediate from the observation structures for each diagnosers that they do not force any plant events and hence the design is passive.
[1] R. Sengupta. Diagnosis and communication in distributed systems. Technical report, PATH, UCB, July 1998.
Correctness of the diagnoser design
To verify the correctness of the design we must verify: 2. that there are no false alarms. If there is no fault then it is no plant behavior that leads to state in which B(um, , . . . , umb) # 0.
We will enrich the plant model with a fault-generation unit such that a selected fault, uj, may nondeterministically be generated at any time during a cycle. We take note of our fault model in Section 2.2, i.e. transmission faults are modeled by disengaging the outgoing uni-directional channel of that transmitter and receiver faults are modeled symbolically. There is no loss of generality in forcing the fault to occur during the first cycle since the plant operation is periodic.
The function 6 is modeled by the timed automaton of Figure 7 . And finally we can specify conditions 1 and 2 formally with TCTL:
wait + VO Good Recision [2] F. Eskafi. A diagnostic system design for the intra-platoon communication system in NAHSC demo'97. Tech. report, PATH, UCB, December 1997.
